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1, 3,

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No-

950338-CA

v.
Priority No.

TIMOTHY KENT REDMOND,

2

Defendant/Appellant,
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of stolen
property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann,
§ 76-6-408 (1995), in the Eighth Judicial District Court, in and
for Uintah County, State of Utah, the Honorable John R. Anderson,
presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Should this Court review defendant's claim that he was

denied an impartial jury when defendant affirmatively approved of
the trial court's remedy of a potential jury problem?

"[I]f a

party through counsel . . . has led the trial court into error,
[an appellate court] will then decline to save that party from
the error."

State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989),

cert, denied. Bullock v. Utah. 497 U.S. 1024, 110 S. Ct. 3270
(1990).
2.

Should this Court consider the merits of defendant's

claim that evidence was insufficient to support the jury's
verdict of guilt when he has failed to marshal the evidence in
support of the jury's verdict?

Failure to marshal the evidence

in support of the jury's verdict of guilt waives an appellantfs
right to have his claim of insufficiency considered on appeal.
State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.l (Utah App.), cert, denied.
843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992),
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES ANP R^gg
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules
are pertinent to this issues on appeal:
United States Constitution, Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his
defense.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995)
(1) A person commits theft if he receives,
retains, or disposes of the property of
another knowing that it has been stolen, or
believing that it probably has been stolen,
or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in
concealing, selling, or withholding the
property from the owner, knowing the property
to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner
of it.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Timothy Kent Edmond, was charged with possession
of stolen property, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995) (R. 1). Following a jury trial
defendant was convicted of the offense as charged (R. 59). The
trial court sentenced defendant to a term of one-to-fifteen years
in the Utah State Prison (R. 129-30).
2

STATEMENT OF THg FACT?1
Ffrgtg R a t i n g tP Jury Imp^ytj^IAty CX»im
Shortly after prospective jury members began arriving at the
district court, defense counsel discovered that the court's daily
calender had been posted on the bulletin board in the office in
which the panel members checked in (R. 204, 218-19).

The

calender indicated that, in addition to defendant's trial in this
case, defendant would also have a disposition hearing on a theft
of services charge (Daily calender, R. 58, attached at Addendum
A).

Defense counsel removed the notice, not knowing whether any

venireman had seen the disposition notice (R. 205-06) .
The trial court initially thought that five or six venireman
might have looked at the notice, and the prosecutor suggested
calling a new jury or asking the venireman directly if any of
them had seen the notice (R. 205-07).

The trial court rejected

the prosecutor's remedies when the court clerk indicated that the
prospective jurors had signed in and received their checks in the
order in which they arrived and there had not been more six or
seven jurors in the office when defense counsel removed the
notice (R. 206-07).

In response to the trial court's suggestion

that the venireman who came in while the notice was posted be
excused, defense counsel stated, WI think that's the best thing
we can do" (R. 206). Thereafter, responding to concerns about
the adequacy of the venire's size if the first-appearing
venireman were excused, defense counsel twice indicated his wish

1

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict. State v. Cosey. 873 P.2d 1177, 1178 (Utah App.),
Cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). Accord State v.
Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 233 (Utah 1992).
3

to proceed, stating, "I want to give it a shot" and uwe have done
the best thing we can" (R. 209, 210).
The trial court then made a record of its remedy of the
problem, indicating that the procedure stipulated to by the
parties would cure any possible prejudice to defendant (R. 218).
Defense counsel specifically agreed that he would not object to
the method by which the problem had been cured (R. 217). Shortly
afterward, however, it became apparent that, because there
existed the possibility that prospective jury members might not
have signed in in the precise order in which they arrived and
possibly glanced at the bulletin board, there was no absolute
certainty that the venireman to be excused were the only ones who
had seen the notice (R. 218-19).

Nonetheless, after consulting

with the clerk responsible for signing in and paying the
prospective jurors and who had watched the jurors enter the
office, defense counsel expressed his willingness to have the
trial court cure any problem by excusing the first five venireman
only (R. 220). When the prosecutor requested assurance that
defense counsel would not later move for a mistrial, defense
counsel responded, "Well, I think we have agreed to this
disposition we have done it [sic]" (R. 220). Thereafter, the
first five venireman were specifically identified and later
excused (R. 221, 227).

Facts A4<fo<?e4 at Tri»I delating tP Offense
On September 23, 1994, Lee Berge, owner of LA Auto in Orem,
noticed that a red 1985 Mazda GLC, listed for sale at $2950, was

4

missing from the lot (R. 297-99, 302) .2 The car had passed a
safety inspection prior to its disappearance (R. 309). However,
when he ultimately recovered the car it was in very different
condition, to wit:

the emblems, windshield wipers, steering

wheel cover, visors, spare tire, jack and tools, radio and area
around the shifter had been removed (R. 305-06) .
Several days prior to the theft of the red Mazda, on
September 18, sixteen year-old Andrea Hardman met defendant, who
was then dating Andrea's sister, Angela Davis, in Vernal at her
mother's house (R. 341-43, 347). On that date defendant was
driving a blue 1983 Mazda, which, in the presence of Andrea's
mother, Diane Davis, and sister, he offered to sell to Andrea for
$500 (R. 343-44) . On September 20 or 21 Andrea test drove the
blue Mazda and made plans to buy it (R. 344, 348). Andrea next
saw defendant on September 24 at her house, at which time
defendant was driving a red Mazda with Washington state license
plates.

Defendant claimed to have gotten the car from "some guy

in Orem" (R.

348-49, 372). Diane Davis also saw defendant

driving a little red Mazda on September 28, which he claimed to
have gotten from some guy in Orem for $200, when defendant
stopped at her house en route to Dinosaur with her daughter
Angela (R. 372).
On September 25 or 26 Andrea saw defendant again, this time
at his apartment (R. 350) . Both the red Mazda that she had
earlier seen defendant with and the blue Mazda were in the

2

Berge testified that he purchased the car for about
$1600.00, plus freight and mechanics expenses (R. 302-03). He
also put in another engine at a cost of $300.00 to $350.00 and a
rebuilt transmission at a cost of 423.50 (R. 303-04).
5

driveway with their hoods raised (R. 350, 352). Andrea asked
defendant if the red car was for sale, and defendant offered to
sell it to her for $100 (R. 351). Andrea noticed that the Mazda
stickers had been torn off (R. 352). Defendant said that he had
taken parts from the red Mazda and put them in the blue Mazda so
that it would be in really good running shape for her (R. 352).
On October 7, Andrea and her husband, Doug Hardman, drove to
defendant's apartment where they saw defendant packing all his
belongings into a silver Mazda (R. 52-53).

In the driveway the

Hardmans saw the red Mazda (R. 353). Andrea and Doug
collectively testified that the radio, back seat, the dashboard
and part of the console and the steering wheel cover were missing
from the red Mazda (R. 354, 451-54).

After seeing the condition

of the red Mazda, Andrea renewed her offer to buy the blue Mazda
(R. 354). Defendant responded that he would just give her the
red Mazda for parts (R. 354). The Hardmans drove to their home
to get a tow rope, but on the way Doug told Andrea that he did
not want the car (R. 355, 455).
Andrea returned to defendant's apartment intending to tell
him that she no longer wanted the red Mazda, but was persuaded by
defendant, who was in a hurry to leave, that the car would be
good for parts and that he had to get it out of his driveway (R.
355-56, 373, 376). With Andrea in the red Mazda, defendant used
the silver Mazda to push the red car to Andrea's house (R. 356,
455-56).

Coincidentally, Diane Davis saw defendant pushing her

daughter in the red Mazda while driving her own car (R. 357,
386).

Before leaving, defendant removed the license plates and

directed her, after she was done using the car for parts, to push
it to a nearby apartment complex where there were twenty to
6

thirty old cars sitting (R. 357-58).

He also told her that

because it was a "parts" car, she should never attempt to license
it (R. 356-57).

Diane Davis similarly testified that defendant

told her that when Andrea was done removing parts and tires for
the blue Mazda Andrea should haul the car to the junk yard (R.
385).

When Diane asked defendant about a bill of sale or title,

defendant told her that he had a bill of sale but that it had
gotten mixed up with his things during his move.

He also

cautioned her not to make any attempt to license the car (R.
3 85).

Andrea did not see defendant again after October 7 (R.

342) .
Suspicious of defendant's directions to his wife, Doug
notified the police about the car the following day, October 8
(R. 456). Vernal Patrolman Drew Christiansen investigated the
matter and found that the vehicle identification number (VIN) of
the red Mazda left at the Hardman residence matched that of the
red 1985 Mazda GLC stolen from LA Auto in Orem on September 24
(R. 326-27, 330).
At trial, defendant claimed that the prosecution witnesses
concocted their testimony to hide their own connection with the
stolen vehicle, with which he had no association.

Defendant

testified that he never possessed the stolen red 1985 Mazda (R.
416).

He claimed instead that he had purchased a red 1982 Mazda

from an Antonio Vigil for $100, for which he had a bill of sale,
and which he later sold to Rachel Bezzant (R. 407-09).

Rachel

Bezzant testified that defendant had sold her a red 1982 GLC
Mazda hatchback in November of 1994 (R. 398-99).

According to

defendant, it was the 1982 Mazda that was in Vernal on October 7
(R. 413). On that date he and his wife, Chris Redmond, drove to
7

Vernal in his blue Mazda and returned to Orem that evening with
Chris driving the red 1982 Mazda after seeing Floyd Collett, LDS
bishop of the ninth ward in Vernal (R. 414-15).

In support,

Collett testified that he met with defendant at 7:00 p.m., just
before defendant left Vernal for Orem (R. 3 93-96).3

Chris

Redmond testified in accordance with defendant concerning her
movements on October 7 (R. 440-44).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
The Court should refuse to consider defendant's claim that
he was denied an impartial jury because he affirmatively endorsed
the trial court's solution to the possibility that some
prospective jurors had seen the daily calender indicating that
defendant had a misdemeanor matter pending before the court.
Defense counsel strongly agreed with the trial court's suggestion
that only those prospective jurors likely to have seen the notice
be excused and, further, announced that he would not move for a
mistrial based on the court's handling of the problem.

Thus, any

error in the manner of curing the problem was invited by
defendant.

Moreover, any error was harmless since defendant

testified on direct examination that he had previously been
convicted of felony forgery.

3

Collett's testimony was intended to discredit any
association of defendant with the red Mazda by showing
inconsistency in the times the witnesses said defendant pushed
the car to the Hardman residence, to wit: Andrea Hardman
testified the event occurred at about 6:30 or 7:00 p.m. (R. 369,
373), Diane Davis said it occurred before 8:00 p.m., when the sun
was setting and it was not yet dark (R. 3 88) , and Doug Hardman
that it would have been about 4:00 to 4:30 p.m. (R. 459).
8

POINT H
Defendant has failed to marshal evidence in support of the
jury's verdict, and therefore, this Court should refuse to
consider his claim that the evidence was insufficient to convict
him of possession of stolen property.
was sufficient.

In any case, the evidence

Defendant was found in possession of a vehicle

which indisputably had been stolen, weeks after the theft and
which he had torn apart.

His knowledge that the car was stolen

was further demonstrated by his deliberately cautioning witnesses
not to license the car and to dispose of it among other junk cars
after they had used it for parts.
hRGJjmm

POINT I
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED HIS
RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY IS WITHOUT
SUBSTANTIVE MERIT AND CONSTITUTES INVITED
ERROR
"As a general rule, a timely and specific objection must be
made in order to preserve an issue for appeal. Absent a timely
objection, [an appellate court] will review an alleged error only
if it is obvious and harmful, i.e., only if it constitutes 'plain
error.'"

State v. Whittle. 780 P.2d 819, 820-21 (Utah 1989)

(citations omitted).

"But if a party through counsel has made a

conscious decision to refrain from objection or has led the trial,
court into error, fan appellate court! will then decline to save
that party from the error."

State vT gullQCk, 791 P.2d 155, 158

(Utah 1989) (emphasis added), cert, denied, Bullock v. Utah. 497
U.S. 1024, 110 S. Ct. 3270 (1990).

See State v. Smith. 776 P.2d

929, 932 (Utah App. 1989) ("A defendant cannot lead the court
into error by failing to object and then later, when he is
9

displeased with the verdict, profit by his actions."); State v.
Ellifritz. 835 P.2d 170, 177-78 (Utah App. 199) (refusing to
review on appeal either the defense counsel's performance or the
trial court's discretion in not removing certain jurors claimed
objectionable for cause where counsel clearly and deliberately
chose not to challenge them for cause); State v. Medina. 738 P.2d
1021, 1022-23 (Utah 1987) (refusing to review a jury instruction
for plain error where the defense counsel affirmatively led the
trial court to believe that there was nothing wrong with the
instruction).
In this case a problem developed when the venire was exposed
to a court calender indicating that defendant had been charged
with another offense.

However, it is obvious that defense

counsel affirmatively joined in trial court's remedy of that
problem, i.e., excusing the potentially tainted jurors based on
the attending clerk's identification of those persons (R. 21720).

Indeed, in response to the prosecutor's concern about a

mistrial, defense counsel stated that he would not move for a
mistrial since he had specifically stipulated to the trial
court's method of curing the problem (R. 220). Defendant,
represented on appeal by counsel different than at trial, has not
argued plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel.4

4

Even considering the plain error doctrine, it has no
application in this case. In explaining the relationship between
plain error and invited error, the court in Bullock said:
The plain error rule exists to permit
review of trial court rulings as way of
protecting a defendant from the harm that can
be caused from less-than-perfect counsel.
But the purpose of that rule is in no way

implicated if defense counsel consciously
10

Therefore, this Court should decline to review his claim.
PQINT II
DEFENDANT FAILS TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF THE JURY VERDICT, FOR WHICH THERE
WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
In order to successfully challenge the juryfs verdict the
reviewing court must find that the evidence and its inferences
are so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted."

State v. Petree.

659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded by rule on other
grounds, State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987).

In

undertaking such review, the appellate court will "view the
evidence, along with the reasonable inferences from it, in the
light most favorable to the verdict."

State v. Moore. 802 P.2d

732, 738 (Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted).

"The jury, not the

appellate court, weighs the evidence and assesses witness
credibility/ so long

as some evidence and reasonable inferences

elects to permit evidence +n u e admitted as

part of a defense strategy .rafter th^n
through inadvertence or n^iect.
Bullock. 791 P.2d at 159 (emphasis added). In any event, it is
inconceivable that any reference in the calender to a misdemeanor
offense (R. 58, 218), even if seen by any venireman, "probably
had an influence in producing the verdict rendered", see State v.
Gee. 541 P.2d 6, 7 (Utah 1975) (new trial not merited where there
was no showing that a juror was actually exposed to a photograph
of the twenty-two month-old murder victim or that it affected the
juror's deliberation), where defendant himself testified that he
had been previously convicted of forgery, a second degree felony
(R. 58, 404). Cf. State v. Burk. 839 P.2d 880, 883-84 (Utah App.
1992) (finding harmless any possible error in allowing the
admission of potentially prejudicial testimony when defendant
failed to object to other testimony having substantially the same
import), cert, denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
11

support the juryfs findings, we will not disturb them.
v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)."

See State

Ibid.

To meet this burden, defendant must marshal all the evidence
in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that even viewing
it in the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence
is insufficient to support the verdict.

Failure to so marshal

the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his claim of
insufficiency considered on appeal.

Mincy. 838 P.2d at 652 n.l

(citing Moore. 802 P.2d at 738-39).
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant
fails to marshal any evidence in support of the jury's verdict,
arguing instead his own view of the evidence.5

5

On this ground

Specifically, defendant argues (1) the evidence did not
show the stolen car was "operable," (2) the car was from Arizona,
but according to prosecution witnesses had Washington license
plates, (3) there was no direct evidence that defendant knew or
believed the car was stolen, (4) the State's witnesses were
inconsistent about the time defendant pushed the car to Andrea
Hardman's house, (5) the investigating officer failed to take
fingerprints from the car, which would have conclusively
corroborated defendant's lack of contact with the stolen car and
(6) it is inherently improbable that defendant could have been in
work clothes when pushing the car to the Hardman residence.
Appellant's Br. at 15-17.
None of these arguments take cognizance of the standard of
review applied to the jury's verdict, to wit: that the jury may
make its own credibility determinations and make reasonable
inferences from the evidence and that its verdict is reversed
only upon a showing of inherent improbability or substantial
inconclusiveness.
Moreover, the arguments lack substance: (1) Lee Berge, owner
of LA Auto, testified that the missing car had passed an
inspection, and both Andrea and her mother collectively testified
that they saw defendant driving the 1985 red Mazda on September
24 and 28 (R. 309, 348-49, 382-83); (2) the jury was entitled to
infer that defendant had simply put Washington license plates on
the stolen car; (3) the jury could readily have inferred
defendant's knowledge that the car was stolen from his possession
and deliberate instructions to both Andrea and her mother not to
license the car and to hide among other abandoned cars when done
using it for parts (R. 356-58, 385); (4) only Doug Hardman's
12

alone the Court should refuse to consider the merits of
defendant's claim.
In any event, the evidence was sufficient.

Under Utah Code

Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995), the State was required to show that on
October 7, 1994, defendant, with a purpose to deprive the owner,
disposed of an operable motor vehicle belonging to LA Auto,
knowing or believing that it had probably been stolen (Jury
Instruction #4, R. 77, attached at Addendum B). 6 Andrea Hardman
and Diane Davis collectively testified that they saw defendant
drive a red Mazda on September 24 and 28, 1994 (R. 348-49, 38283).

The red 1985 Mazda that both witnesses testified defendant

pushed to the Hardman residence on October 7 was the car stolen
from LA Auto, evidenced by the matching VIN (R. 3 02, 330, 352-56,
386).

Defendant's intent to deprive LA Auto of its property was

estimate of the time when he saw defendant push the car suggested
an inconsistency, which the jury evidently discounted since
Andrea and her mother testified fairly closely about the time (R.
369, 388, 459); (5) the failure of the investigating officer to
take fingerprints has no bearing on the sufficiency of the
evidence that was adduced; and (6) contrary to defendant's
suggestion, none of the State's witnesses testified about how
defendant was dressed on October 7. Indeed, because there was no
discrepancy in the testimony, it is unlikely that the jury
attached any significance to Collett's testimony that defendant
was neatly dressed when he left Vernal (R. 3 96).
6

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1995), provides:
(1) A person commits theft if he receives,
retains, or disposes of the property of
another knowing that it has been stolen, or
believing that it probably has been stolen,
or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in
concealing, selling, or withholding the
property from the owner, knowing the property
to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner
of it.
13

shown not only by the fact of defendant's extended possession,
but also by the diminishment of its value by defendant's
dismantling the car.

Finally, the jury was reasonably entitled

to infer defendant's belief that the car was stolen from his very
deliberate instructions to Andrea not license the car and then
that she dispose of it where it would not likely be recovered as
a stolen vehicle (R. 356-58, 385).
QHAh ftRgVMSNT NOT EEOUPSTEP
Based on this Courtfs prior development of the issues raised
in this case, the State does not request oral argument.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully
requests that defendant's conviction be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

%

day of April, 1996.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to Mark
T. Ethington, Day & Barney, attorney&^for defendant, 45 E. Vine
Street, Murray, Utah 84107, this
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day of April, 1996
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ADDENDUM B

INSTRUCTION NUMBER

^

In order to establish the commission of any crime charged,
the State must prove certain essential facts which the statutes
of this State define as being necessary elements constituting the
crime charged.

In the case now before the Court, proof of the

commission of the crime of "Possession of Stolen Property" as
charged in the Information requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of each of the following:
1.

5.

That on or between the 7th day of October, 1994, and
the 8th day of October, 1994;
In Uintah County, State of Utah;
Timothy Kent Redmond;
Did receive, retain or dispose of the property of
another, knowing that it had been stolen, or believing
that it had probably been stolen;
With a purpose to deprive the owner thereof;

6.

Said property was an operable motor vehicle.

2.
3.
4.

Therefore, if you find from the evidence received during the
trial that the State has proven each and every one of these
essential facts beyond a reasonable doubt it would be your duty
to find the Defendant guilty.

On the other hand, if you find by

the evidence received during the trial that the State has failed
to prove any one of those essential facts beyond a reasonable
doubt, it would be your duty to find the Defendant not guilty.

